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This paper deals with the economic effects and the policy implications of trade liberalisation on the 
Jordanian economy, with emphasis on welfare, income distribution and real wages of heterogene-
ous households, by using a neoclassical dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 
Specifically the paper assesses the impacts of preferential trade liberalisation with the European 
Union (EU) and compare them with those brought about by broad and non-discriminatory trade 
liberalisation.
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1. Introduction
The process of preferential trade liberalisation undertaken by Jordan in the framework 
of the Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU) is expected to pro-
vide benefits for Jordan in terms of lower import prices of investment and consumption 
goods that bring about higher consumer welfare. Investment demand plays a key role in 
the process of trade liberalisation, and determines the dynamic behaviour of investment 
and output, which are expected to increase in the long-run (Francois et al., 1997 and 
Baldwin, 1993). On the other hand, trade liberalisation has an unpleasant effect for the 
government. There is a loss in government revenue, due to foregone import tariff duties. 
Such an impact is likely to be particularly strong for Jordan, where government revenue 
1  * I would like to thank Timo Trimborn, Beatriz Gaitan Soto, Bernd Lucke and Stefan 
Kolev.
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relies heavily on custom duties.2 The policy implications for Jordan suggest, therefore, 
that in order to counteract the adverse effects on government revenue due to the reduc-
tion in custom duties the government should accompany the trade liberalisation process 
with appropriate measures of public finance. However, such measures could make wel-
fare impacts ambiguous, particularly for those households who rely heavily on transfer 
from the government. Furthermore, low-income households will probably fail to exploit 
the benefits of increased incentives for investment and will therefore fail to make use of 
the full potential of trade liberalisation. As pointed out by Winters (1996), trade reforms 
might affect households asymmetrically and might even create some losers.
A trade policy issue playing a role in Jordan’s trade liberalisation is the debate about glob-
al versus regional integration (Winters, 1996). Whereas there is wide empirical evidence 
that economic growth rates and trade liberalisation are positively related (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995), there is further evidence supporting the view that non-discriminatory trade 
openness leads to higher growth than preferential trade liberalisation does (Vamvakidis, 
1998). Moreover, preferential trade liberalisation is likely to cause trade diversion, that 
is a diversion of Jordanian imports from more efficient non-EU countries to more costly 
EU producers. The policy implications for Jordan therefore suggest that broad and non-
discriminatory openness would be more beneficial than regional integration (Hoekman 
and Djankov, 1997, Ghesquiere, 1998). A multilateral and non-discriminatory trade liber-
alisation process would also avoid the costs of trade diversion, although it would clearly 
reduce further government revenues, and hence require additional compensatory meas-
ures of public finance.
Previous studies by Hosoe (2001) and Lucke (2001) on Jordan’s trade liberalisation im-
plemented static CGE models with one single representative household and focused on 
aggregate welfare and fiscal effects. However, these models do not account for dynamic 
effects due to capital accumulation and can not analyse income distribution effects.3
Theoretical studies by Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (2000) analyse the ef-
fects of introducing heterogeneous consumers into a neoclassical framework. However, 
the first approach that analyses income distribution in an applied dynamic neoclassical 
general equilibrium framework in which heterogeneous households are assumed to have 
different discount rates has been developed by Feraboli and Trimborn (2006), who aug-
mented the dynamic CGE model developed by Feraboli et al. (2003) by introducing het-
erogeneous households.
This paper addresses the question of how both preferential and non-discriminatory trade 
liberalisation combined with a parallel process of complementary economic reforms af-
fect welfare of heterogeneous households by implementing the dynamic computable gen-
eral equilibrium (CGE) of Feraboli and Trimborn (2006).
2   Import duties from EU trade in Jordan in the period 1994-96 averaged 12% of total 
tax revenue and 2% of GDP, total import duties averaged more than one-third of total tax 
revenue and about 6% of GDP (Abed, 1998).
3   To my knowledge, there is no other study on Jordan’s trade liberalisation based on a 
dynamic CGE model with heterogeneous households.45
2. The EU-Jordan Association agreement
The 1977 Cooperation Agreement granted Jordan duty-free access to the EU markets 
for most industrial products and preferential access for agricultural commodities. The 
Cooperation Agreement has been replaced by EU-Jordan Association Agreement (AA), 
which was signed in November 1997 and entered into force in May 2002. The AA pro-
vides the gradual reduction of import duties on imports of EU industrial and agricultural 
products into Jordan over a period of twelve years and aims at creating a free trade area 
between the EU and Jordan for most of the industrial sectors. Table 1 shows the pre-AA 
import duty rates and the tariff reduction schedule of the Association Agreement for eight 
good sectors.4
Period Agric. Mining Food Text. Paper Chem. Miner. Others
Pre-Agreement rates 17.0% 9.4% 29.2% 14.1% 13.2% 2.8% 12.2% 12.2%
Entry into force of the AA 17.0% 5.6% 29.2% 8.5% 7.9% 1.7% 7.3% 7.3%
One year after 17.0% 5.0% 29.2% 7.5% 7.0% 1.5% 6.5% 6.5%
Two years after 17.0% 4.4% 29.2% 6.6% 6.2% 1.3% 5.7% 5.7%
Three years after 17.0% 3.8% 29.2% 5.7% 5.3% 1.1% 4.9% 4.9%
Four years after 15.3% 2.8% 26.3% 4.2% 4.0% 0.8% 3.7% 3.7%
Five years after 13.6% 2.5% 23.4% 3.8% 3.5% 0.8% 3.3% 3.3%
Six years after 11.9% 2.2% 20.4% 3.3% 3.1% 0.7% 2.9% 2.9%
Seven years after 10.2% 1.9% 17.5% 2.8% 2.6% 0.6% 2.4% 2.4%
Eight years after 8.5% 1.6% 14.6% 2.4% 2.2% 0.5% 2.0% 2.0%
Nine years after 8.5% 1.3% 14.6% 1.9% 1.8% 0.4% 1.6% 1.6%
Ten years after 8.5% 0.9% 14.6% 1.4% 1.3% 0.3% 1.2% 1.2%
11 years after 8.5% 0.6% 14.6% 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 0.8% 0.8%
12 years after 8.5% 0.0% 14.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 1
Tariff reduction schedule of the AA with the EU.
3. The Model
The Jordanian economy is modelled as a dynamic small open economy, by using the 
model developed by Feraboli and Trimborn (2006), which builds upon previous work 
done by Feraboli et al. (2003). The domestic economy has nine production sectors, eight 
of which produce goods and one produces services. Aggregate private consumption, gov-
ernment consumption, and aggregate investment are Cobb-Douglas composites of nine 
different sectoral outputs, which, in turn, are composites of domestically produced and 
imported goods (Armington,1969). Firms produce nine different commodities using a 
4   The production sectors are Agriculture, Mining, Food, Textiles, Papers, Chemicals, 
Minerals, and Others.46
Leontief production technology that employs sectoral goods and a value-added produc-
tion, which is in turn a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite of capital and 
six different kinds of labour. Total output can be sold domestically or exported according 
to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) specification. The Government raises 
taxes, collects import tariffs and runs a balanced budget. Government revenues are spent 
for a fixed amount of government consumption as well as for transfers to households. The 
domestic economy is a price-taker in international markets. Perfect competition and full 
employment are assumed in all sectors. Production factors are perfectly mobile across 
sectors.
For each of the six different household groups, the representative consumer chooses con-
sumption and new capital so as to maximise discounted utility, subject to the budget 
constraint, the motion equation of capital, the equality between savings and investment, 
and the given initial level of capital stock.
The problem of each representative infinitely-lived household i is therefore to maximize 
discounted intertemporal utility
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where Ci, YDi, Ki and SAVi are consumption, disposable income, capital and saving of 
household i, respectively. Each representative household discounts future utility with dis-
count rate ρi, which is specific to each household category. PC and PI are the composite 
prices of private consumption and investment goods and δ is the depreciation rate of 
capital.
Disposable income of each household group is given by
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where wi, Li, Ki, GTi and FTi denote the individual wage rate, labour endowment, capital 
endowment, government transfer and foreign transfers to household i, respectively. The 
interest rate r is identical for each household since capital is a homogenous good. Each 
household pays a different income tax τi depending on its household group.
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where ci,j is household i’s consumption of good j,  , ij θ  is the share parameter of good j in 
consumption of household i, and Ωi is the shift parameter in the Cobb-Douglas consump-
tion function of household i.
4. Data and Calibration
The calibration procedure is based on the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Jordan 
constructed for the year 2002.5 On the assumption that the dataset represents an equi-
librium of the economy, functional parameters in the model, such as share and shift pa-
rameters, are calibrated, i.e. they are estimated, such that the SAM represents a solution 
of the model. Household survey data allows disaggregation into six different groups of 
households. Each group differs with respect to labour income, capital income, transfers 
from government and from abroad, income-tax payments, and savings, as well as total 
consumption and the composition of total consumption. Households are taxed with a 
progressive, general income tax, resulting in different net interest rates6. Therefore, each 
household faces different incentives for saving. Time preference rates are then calibrated 
from survey data by assuming that consumption levels of all households are stationary in 
the long-run. Table 2 presents size and income composition of the household groups. For 
convenience household group one (HH1) is denoted as the poorest and household group 
six (HH6) as the richest household group.
The model is programmed in Gauss and solved with the relaxation procedure as proposed 
by Trimborn et al. (2008).
Class Individuals Labour Capital Gov. Transfer Foreign remit.
HH1 81184 48% 27% 14% 11%
HH2 583420 58% 24% 10% 8%
HH3 970240 58% 27% 8% 7%
HH4 1251301 52% 32% 9% 7%
HH5 1224470 45% 39% 8% 8%
HH6 939704 30% 57% 6% 7%
Table 2
Size and income composition of the household groups
5   The SAM was constructed by Feraboli and Kolev.
6   This reflects the tax system in Jordan.48
5. Simulations
Since the dataset available for the calibration procedure represents the Jordanian econo-
my in the year 2002, this is the benchmark year. All variables at their benchmark levels 
have been normalised to one. Exogenous shocks are then implemented in the model, in 
order to compute the counterfactual equilibrium determined by the change in the policy 
regime. The effects of the policy change are assessed by comparison between counterfac-
tual and benchmark equilibria.
The two simulations run in this work have two components: (i) the gradual reduction 
of import duties given by the EU-Jordan Association Agreement (AA), i.e. the schedule 
shown in Table 1, and (ii) the domestic counteracting policy response, i.e. the endogenisa-
tion of aggregate government transfer to households.7
The first simulation applies the gradual reduction of import duties only to the EU imports, 
i.e. it implements the AA with the EU. The immediate effect of reducing import rates 
on EU imports is a change in the relative prices in the domestic economy. The price of 
EU imports falls relatively to the price of imports from the rest of world. The composite 
import price will also decrease relative to the price of domestically-produced goods. The 
fall in the import prices boosts domestic demand and increases incentives for investment, 
which in turn leads to faster capital accumulation. In the long-run equilibrium this leads to 
a higher value of aggregate capital stock. Output is also expected to increase in the long-
run. The loss in government revenue due to reduction in import duties is partially offset 
by the expansion in the tax base in the long-run. In the short-run government transfer 
to households is expected to fall to compensate for the immediate drop in government 
revenue. Consumption is likely to increase in the long-run on aggregate and also for each 
household class, but in the short-run consumption of specific household groups or even 
aggregate consumption might fall
The impact on welfare on each household class is therefore ambiguous. On the one 
hand, consumption is likely to increase in the long-run and this has therefore a posi-
tive impact on welfare. On the other hand, the fall in the government revenue brought 
about by trade liberalisation forces the government to reduce transfers to households, at 
least in the short-run. This affects negatively disposable income of households, who are 
forced, ceteris paribus, to reduce consumption. Clearly this will affect welfare negatively. 
Moreover, whereas aggregate consumption might increase in the short-run, the benefits 
might be distributed unevenly across different households, and some specific household 
category can be worse off after the trade liberalisation takes place.
In the second simulation the trade liberalisation is non-discriminatory, that is the gradual 
reduction of import tariff rates applies to all imports. This brings about a bigger negative 
effect on composite import prices, which is likely to have a larger positive impact on wel-
fare than under the case of discriminatory trade liberalisation. However, full liberalisation 
has also a larger negative impact on government revenue. This might result in a larger 
decrease in government transfer to households and therefore in a larger negative impact 
7   More precisely, aggregate transfer from the government to households is endogenous, 
whereas the share of each household’s transfer in aggregate transfer is fixed.49
on welfare. Hence the impact on welfare of individual households might be in principle 
ambiguous under both scenarios.
The simulation results lead to welfare changes in Jordan between –0.08% and 0.42%, 
as shown in Table 3, providing therefore evidence that trade liberalisation has different 
effects across heterogeneous households and can even create some losers. Low-income 
households gain slightly more from trade liberalisation in terms of welfare, since they 
can overcome losses in government transfer by an increase in the wage income due to ag-
gregate capital accumulation. However, income inequality increases, since high income 
households can exploit the benefits of increased incentives for investment. This results 
in higher capital income and leads therefore to an increase in the income gap. Moreover, 
whereas preferential trade liberalisation makes one household worse off, non-discrimi-
natory trade liberalisation leads to positive effects on welfare for all household groups. 
Finally, the behaviour of aggregate variables is qualitatively consistent with previous 
work done by Feraboli et al. (2003).
Scenario HH1 HH2 HH3 HH4 HH5 HH6
AA with the EU 0.12 0.42 0.18 0.11 -0.08 0.14
Full liberalisation 0.12 0.31 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.11
Table 3
Welfare effects (percent change)
Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix show the dynamic path of private consumption. Under 
both scenarios the consumption levels of the three richest households (HH4, HH5 and 
HH6) falls below the initial benchmark level (equal to one) and increases afterwards, 
implying that these household groups must give up consumption in the short-run in order 
to achieve higher future consumption. The common feature of the consumption path of 
all household groups is the increase in the short-run and the approach to the long-run 
equilibrium from below.
Since welfare gains are higher for poor households, one might expect income inequality 
to decrease. However, the opposite is the case. The Gini coefficient (Gini, 1912) is used 
as a measure of income inequality. From the initial value of 0.2763, the Gini coefficient 
increases slowly to 0.2786 in the scenario of the AA with the EU and to 0.2837 in the 
scenario of broad and non-discriminatory trade liberalisation. Hence, the process of trade 
liberalisation leads in both cases to larger income gap among household groups.
The reason for this can be seen in Figures 3 and 4. Whereas the capital stocks owned by 
the richest household increase over time, the two poorest household groups (HH1 and 
HH2) use their capital assets to smooth consumption and therefore deaccumulate capital. 
This leads to a widening income gap between rich and poor.
The real wage is at all periods above the benchmark level and the poorest household 
groups experience a slightly larger increase than rich households.50
6. Conclusions
In this paper the question of how preferential and non-discriminatory trade liberalisation 
affect different households has been investigated. The model implemented here is a dy-
namic, neoclassical computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, augmented by intro-
ducing heterogeneous households. Each of the six household groups differs with respect 
to income, initial endowments of assets, transfers from the government and from abroad, 
wage rate, income tax rate and individual preferences. Whereas several studies imple-
mented CGE models to address trade liberalisation and income distribution issues in a 
dynamic framework, this work uses the approach developed by Feraboli and Trimborn 
(2006), who introduced the fundamental assumption that different household groups are 
characterised by different discount rates, which are calibrated from the available data.
Trade liberalisation lowers prices for investment and consumption goods in the domes-
tic economy and therefore boosts internal demand and output, which in turn leads to 
faster capital accumulation. Government transfer to household decreases due to foregone 
government revenue brought about by the reduction in import duties. The results of the 
simulations support the fact that welfare effects are different across households groups, 
and under the scenario of preferential trade liberalisation one household group is even 
worse off. Therefore trade liberalisation alone is not always Pareto improving for Jordan. 
Moreover, welfare gains are slightly higher for poor households, who can compensate for 
the reduction in transfer from the government by an increase in labour income. However, 
the income gap between rich and poor increases slightly. Whereas rich households’ capi-
tal income increases sharply in the long-run due to exploitation of investment incentives, 
low-income households deaccumulate capital over time in order to smooth consumption.
Hence, the introduction of heterogeneous households into a standard dynamic CGE mod-




Effects of the AA with the EU on consumption
Figure 2
Effects of full liberalisation on consumption52
Figure 3
Effects of the AA with the EU on capital
Figure 4
Effects of full liberalisation on capital53
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